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RECENT DECISIONS
That this decision is far-reaching cannot be doubted, for it may
eventually effect every business which carries on some "activity" out-
side its domiciliary state. The staggering impact of the decision will
be felt by small, as well as large, corporations, each facing the very
real burden of multiple state taxation. It is interesting to note that
the majority's opinion handled the problem of multiple taxation by
saying that it cannot deal in abstractions and, therefore, since there
was nothing to show that such taxation was present, it could not con-
sider that issue. The minority, however, recognized the problem and
its importance, Mr. Justice Frankfurter saying:
... The cost of such a far-flung scheme for complying with the taxing
requirements of the different states may well exceed the burden of the
taxes themselves, especially in -the case of small companies doing a small
volume of business in several States.... P
This decision has opened up a new era, in which practically no
obstades remain to prevent a state from taxing interstate commerce.
Its effect will surely be felt by all engaged in business.
BRUC E L. NEWMAN
NEGLIGENCE - CONFUSION AT THE INTERSECTION
Two automobiles approach an intersection at right angles. No
traffic sign or signal faces either of them. A, the driver on the right,
intends to turn to the right at the intersection. There is a squeal of
brakes and crunch of metal as the cars carom off each other and come
to rest. Who was to blame, and who will bear the cost of the dam-
age? All things being equal, .4 was to blame for asserting the right
of way over the driver on his left, according to the Franklin County
Court of Appeals in its 1958 decision of Mllichel v. Weber.1 Plain-
tiff, driver .4 in the situation described above, had lost below on a
finding by the jury of contributory negligence,2 and the court of ap-
peals, in affirming, held that the trial court had dealt properly with
this issue. However, as an alternate ground for the decision, the ap-
pellate court answered plaintiff's contention that he had had the right
of way. The court held that plaintiff, having intended to turn to the
right, lost his right of way, with the result that he should have yielded
States will soon have to pass upon a Florida Supreme Court decision requiring the Scripto cor-
poration to collect a use tax on writing instruments sold to Florida consumers and delivered in
interstate commerce. Scripto is a Georgia corporation not qualified to do intrastate business
in Florida. It has no sales office, other place of business, nor stock of merchandise in Florida.
All of its orders were solicited by independent advertising specialty brokers and were sent to
Scripto in Atlanta, for acceptance. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 105 So. 2d 775 (1958) (appeal
filed in the United States Supreme Court, May 27, 1959, Docket No. 80. Jurisdiction noted
October 12, 1959).
.20. 358 U.S. 450, 474 (1959) (dissent.)
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to defendant, the driver on the left, and, thus plaintiff was primarily
to blame, not merely a contributor. Plaintiff's contention was based
upon the statutory rule that the right of way belongs to the driver on
the right at intersections. 3  The court's answer was based upon the
construction of Ohio's statutory definition of the term "right of
way."2
Most states include in their traffic codes a definition of "right of
way" similar to that found in the Illinois code: "Right of way: The
privilege of the immediate use of the roadway. ' 4  Ohio's code is
somewhat unique, inasmuch as its definition states:
"Right of Way" means the right of a vehicle, streetcar, trackless
trolley, or pedestrian, to proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in
the direction in which it or he is moving in preference to another ve-
hicle, streetcar, trackless trolley, or pedestrian approaching from a dif-
ferent direction into its or his path.5
This complex statement seems to be an attempt at writing posi-
tive law, rather than merely giving precise meaning to the statutes to
which it applies, as do most definitions. As such, instead of being a
clarifying mechanism, it poses a problem of construction, particularly
when taken in conjunction with the intersection rule 6 which, in Ohio's
code, is uncomplicated by reference to possible variations of the in-
tersection situation.
Prominent among the cases which interpreted this definition, and
relied upon by the court in the Michel case, is a 1948 decision,
Gratziano v. Grady.7 In that case, the Franklin County Court of Ap-
peals held that a vehicle approaching an intersection from the right
with the intention of making a left turn loses its preferential status
over a vehicle approaching from the left. In construing the Ohio
definition of "right of way," the court decided that the phrase "in
the direction in which it or he is moving" could have no other object
than to limit the right to that of proceeding in a straight line. In
the context of the Gratziano case, that would be a straight line across
the intersection. This interpretation, said the court, was necessary to
avoid emasculating the wording of the definition.' The court in the
Michel case followed the rule of the Gratziano case, and extended it
to include intended turns to the right, as well as to the left.
1. 158 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
2. Plaintiff testified that he had entered the intersection at a reduced speed. Defendant
claimed that plaintiff had entered at an excessive speed. The trial judge submitted the case to
the jury, with a charge on contributory negligence. The court of appeals held that this was
the proper course for the trial court.
3. OHio REV. CODE § 4511.41.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , § 1-158 (1958).
5. OHio REV. CODE § 4511.01 (SS) (Supp. 1959).
6. OHIO REv. CODE 5 4511.41.
7. 83 Ohio App. 265, 78 N.E.2d 767 (1948).
8. Gratziano v. Grady, 83 Ohio App. 265, 274, 78 N.E.2d 767, 771 (1948).
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It must be conceded that the courts had little choice other than
the rule announced. Therefore, the blame lies with the legislature
for putting the traffic law in such an unclear condition. The excep-
tion to the right of way rule, if ai exception was intended, belongs
in the section of the code which declares the rule, not among the defi-
nitions in the introductory section of the statute.'
The rule enunciated by the court is bad, and is in need of revision
for overriding practical considerations. This rule should be a means
of facilitating traffic flow. It will not. Its effect is dependent upon
the intent of driver A, and upon B's knowledge of that intent. Direc-
tional signals are not, and never have been, an effective solution, prin-
cipally because of the imperfect creatures who control them. If A
intends to turn, but neglects to signal, the result would be that the
drivers slow progressively to a standstill, and commence an enactment
of "Alphonse and Gaston," because each is yielding to the other. If
B has the mistaken impression that A is intending to turn, the result
would be that both cars attempt to assert a right of way, and will
probably collide. And what if A has not made up his mind, or
changes it when he reaches the intersection? Are the rights and
duties of the drivers to change in a split second? How much simpler
to let A have the intersection to himself I
Ordinarily, because of the major rule, B immediately decelerates
on first becoming aware of A's presence. Then, because of the ex-
ception, he must ascertain A's intentions and continue to slow down,
or accelerate, according to his conclusion. Why interpose this contin-
gency and uncertainty? Why not require B to follow his first reac-
tion and yield in all cases? This is the rule that has been taught to
drivers, and many of them will continue to believe it to be the law,
despite the decisions, for the simple reason that most drivers receive
little formal traffic education beyond their initial drivers' tests. An
occasional chat with motorcycle patrolmen and bulletins posted by
the Safety Council may impress upon the driver major points of tech-
nique and law, but how well can he be expected to know the fine
points and exceptions? Gratziano v. Grady has been the law for
some twelve years, but, as late as 1959, the information booklet is-
9. Because of this placement of the definition, the rule enunciated here is open to a glaring
reductio ad absurdum. According to the introduction to the definition section, the definitions
apply throughout the traffic rules chapter. The term "right of way" is used liberally with
reference to private vehicles, pedestrians, funeral processions, and emergency vehicles, each
time meaning the right to proceed in a straight line, which right is now lost when the vehicle
intends to turn. An ambulance thus would be preferred only while going straight, and could
not make a turn safely, despite the fact that all other drivers must pull over and stop until it
passes. OHiO REV. CODE § 4511A5 (Supp. 1959). This patently frustrates the intent of
the legislature to prefer emergency vehicles. If this were ever posed to a court, a simple answer
would be "legislative oversight," or emphasis of the emergency aspect. Possibly the firmest
ground would be an analysis of the tenor of § 4511A5, which imposes an express, affirmative
duty upon other drivers to make way for emergency vehicles, whereas the language of the other
sections is couched merely in terms of rights, with their correlative duties to be implied.
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